We introduce a compact graph-theoretic representation for multi-party game theory. Our main result is a provably correct and efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in one-stage games represented by trees or sparse graphs.
INTRODUCTION
In most work on multi-player game theory, payoffs are represented in tabular form: if ¡ agents play a game in which each player has (say) two actions available, the game is given by ¡ matrices, each of size ¢ ¤ £ , specifying the payoffs to each player under any possible combination of joint actions. For game-theoretic approaches to scale to large multi-agent systems, compact yet general representations must be explored, along with algorithms that can efficiently manipulate them¥ .
In this work, we introduce graphical models for multiplayer game theory, and give powerful algorithms for computing their Nash equilibria in certain cases. An ¡ -player game is given by an undirected graph on ¡ vertices and a set of ¡ matrices. The interpretation is that the payoff to player ¦ is determined entirely by the actions of player ¦ and his neighbors in the graph, and thus the payoff matrix for player ¦ is indexed only by these players. We thus view the global ¡ -player game as being composed of interacting local games, each involving (perhaps many) fewer players. Each player's action may have global impact, but it occurs through the propagation of local influences. §
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For multi-stage games, there is a large literature on compact state-based representations for the different stages of the game, such as stochastic games or extensive form games (Owen 1995) . Our focus is on representing one-stage, multi-player games.
There are many common settings in which such graphical models may naturally and succinctly capture the underlying game structure. The graph topology might model the physical distribution and interactions of agents: each salesperson is viewed as being involved in a local competition (game) with the salespeople in geographically neighboring regions. The graph may be used to represent organizational structure: low-level employees are engaged in a game with their immediate supervisors, who in turn are engaged in a game involving their direct reports and their own managers, and so on up to the CEO. The graph may coincide with the topology of a computer network, with each machine negotiating with its neighbors (to balance load, for instance).
There is a fruitful analogy between our setting and Bayesian networks. We propose a representation that is universal: any ¡ -player game can be represented by choosing the complete graph and the original
RELATED WORK
Algorithms for computing Nash equilibria are well-studied. McKelvey and McLennan (1996) survey a wide variety of algorithms covering 2-and ¡ -player games; Nash equilibria and refinements; normal and extensive forms; computing either a sample equilibrium or exhaustive enumeration; and many other variations. They note that ¡ -player games are computationally much harder than 2-player games, in many important ways. The survey discusses approximation techniques for finding equilibria in ¡ -player games. Several of the methods described are not globally convergent, and hence do not guarantee an equilibrium. A method based on simplicial subdivision is described that converges to a point with equilibrium-like properties, but is not necessarily near an equilibrium or an approximate equilibrium. In contrast, for the restricted cases we consider, our algorithms provide running time and solution quality guarantees, even in the case of general-sum, ¡ -player games. Nash (1951) , in the paper that introduces the notion of Nash equilibria, gives an example of a 3-player, finite-action game, and shows it has a unique Nash equilibria. Although all payoffs are rational numbers, Nash shows that the players' action probabilities at the equilibrium are irrational. This suggests that no finite algorithm that takes rational payoffs and transforms them using addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division will be able to compute exact equilibrium policies in general. Thus, the existence of an exact algorithm for finding equilibria in games with treestructured interactions shows that these games are somewhat simpler than general ¡ -player games. It also suggests that approximation algorithms are probably unavoidable for general ¡ -player games.
Several authors have examined graphical representations of games. Koller and Milch (2001) describe an extension of influence diagrams to representing ¡ -player games, and suggest the importance of exploiting graphical structure in solving normal-form games. La Mura (2000) describes a closely related representation, and provides globally convergent algorithms for finding Nash equilibria.
PRELIMINARIES
An ¡ -player, two-action game is defined by a set of ¡ matrices Note that our definitions are entirely representational, and alter nothing about the underlying game theory. Thus, every graphical game has a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, every game can be trivially represented as a graphical game by choosing i to be the complete graph, and letting the local game matrices be the original tabular form matrices. Indeed, in some cases, this may be the most compact graphical representation of the tabular game. However, exactly as for Bayesian networks and other graphical models for probabilistic inference, any time in which the local neighborhoods in i can be bounded by © ¦ ¥ § ¥ ¡ , exponential space savings accrue. Our main results identify graphical structures for which significant computational benefits may also be realized.
ABSTRACT TREE ALGORITHM
In this section, we give an abstract description of our algorithm for computing Nash equilibria in trees (see Figure 1) . By "abstract", we mean that we will leave unspecified (for now) the representation of a certain data structure, and the implementation of a certain computational step. After proving the correctness of this abstract algorithm, in subsequent sections we will describe two instantiations of the missing details-yielding one algorithm that runs in polynomial time and computes approximations of all equilibria, and another algorithm that runs in exponential time and computes all exact equilibria.
If
i is a tree, we can orient this tree by choosing an arbitrary vertex to be the root. Any vertex on the path from a vertex to the root will be called downstream from that vertex, and any vertex on a path from a vertex to a leaf will be called upstream from that vertex. Thus, each vertex other than the root has exactly one downstream neighbor (child), and perhaps many upstream neighbors (parents). We usë can be represented compactly, or even finitely, for arbitrary vertices in a tree. As indicated already, for now we will simply assume a finite representation, and show how this assumption can be met in two different ways in later sections.
The initialization of the downstream pass of the algorithm begins at the leaves of the tree, where the computation of the tables is straightforward. If is a leaf and Figure 1 ). These witness lists will be used on the upstream pass. Again, it is not obvious how to implement the described computation of ! ' % and the witness lists, since # " is continuous and universally quantified. For now, we assume this computation can be done, and describe two specific implementations later.
To see that the semantics of the tables are preserved by the abstract computation just described, suppose that this computation yields to be empty for all
, set ), and
to be 1 and add , or how to finitely implement step 2(d)ii. In Section 5, we show how to implement a modified version of the algorithm that computes approximate equilibria in polynomial time. In Section 6, we implement a modified version that computes exact equilibria in exponential time. We have left the choices of each witness in the upstream pass non-deterministic to emphasize that the tables and witness lists computed represent all the Nash equilibria. Of course, a random equilibrium can be chosen by making these choices random. We discuss the selection of equilibria with desired global properties in Section 7. 
APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe an instantiation of the missing details of algorithm TreeNash that yields a polynomialtime algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria for the tree game¨i p . The approximation can be made arbitrarily precise with greater computational effort.
Rather than playing an arbitrary mixed strategy in 4 ( ¤ © 6
, each player will be constrained to play a discretized mixed strategy that is a multiple of 
where we simply define
a lways.
We will need the following preliminary lemma. . We now bound the difference It is now straightforward to describe the details of our approximate algorithm ApproximateTreeNash. This algorithm is identical to algorithm TreeNash with the following exceptions: £ ¢ ; 1s are drawn as black and 0s as gray. Approximate Nash equilibria for the game are computed from the tables by the upstream pass of the algorithm. One example of a pure equilibrium is
Lemma 2

Lemma 3 Let the mixed strategies
; the tables represent a multitude of mixed equilibria as well.
¤
The algorithm now takes an additional input 
EXACT ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe an implementation of the missing details of algorithm TreeNash that computes exact, rather than approximate, equilibria. In the worst case, the algorithm may run in time exponential in the number of vertices. We remind the reader that even this result is nontrivial, since there are no finite-time algorithms known for computing exact Nash equilibria in general-sum, multiparty games.
As before, let 
, and let . This is a finite bound (which is at most B£ at the root of the entire tree) on the number of rectangular regions required to represent any table in algorithm TreeNash. We thus have given an implementation of the downstream pass-except for the maintainence of the witness lists. Recall that in the approximation algorithm, we proved nothing special about the structure of witnesses, but the witness lists were finite (due to the discretization of mixed strategies). Here these lists may be infinite, and thus cannot be maintained explicitly on the downstream pass. However, it is not difficult to see that witnesses can easily be generated dynamically on the upstream pass (according to a chosen deterministic rule, randomly, non-deterministically, or with some additional bookkeeping, uniformly at random from the set of all equilibria). This is because given¨& Figure 2 are the result of the approximation scheme.
described in this section), and witnesses computed on the upstream pass. We thus have: To provide a feel for the tables produced by the exact algorithm, Figure 3 shows the exact table for vertex 6 in the graph game in Figure 2. 
EXTENSIONS
We have developed a number of extensions and generalizations of the results presented here. We describe some of them briefly, leaving details for the long version of this paper. At this writing, we have verified these extensions only for the approximation algorithm, and are working on the generalizations for the exact algorithm.
Multiple Actions. For ease of exposition, our approximation algorithm was presented for tree games in which players have only two actions available to them. By letting the tables ! & % computed in the downstream pass of this algorithm be of the size necessary to represent the crossproduct of the action spaces available to ¡ and ¢ , we can recover the same result (Theorem 5) for the multiple-action case. The computational cost in the multiple-action case is exponential in the number of actions, but so is the size of the local game matrices (and hence the size of the representation of the tree game).
Vertex Merging for Sparse Graphs. The extension to multiple actions also permits the use of our approximation algorithm on arbitrary graphs. This is analogous to the use of the polytree algorithm on sparse, non-tree-structured Bayes nets. As in that case, the main step is the merging of vertices (whose action set will now be the product action space for the merged players) to convert arbitrary graphs into trees. To handle the merged vertices, we must ensure that the merged players are playing approximate best responses to each other, in addition to the upstream and downstream neighbors. With this additional bit of complexity (again proportional to the size of the representation of the final tree) we recover our result (Theorem 5).
As with the polytree algorithm, running time will scale exponentially with the largest number of merged players, so it is vital to minimize this cluster size. How best to accomplish this we leave to future work.
Special Equilibria. The approximation algorithm has the property that it finds an approximate Nash equilibrium for every exact Nash equilibrium. The potential multiplicity of Nash equilibria has led to a long line of research investigating Nash equilibria satisfying particular properties. By appropriately augmenting the tables computed in the downstream pass of our algorithm, it is possible to identify Nash equilibria that (approximately) maximize the following measures in the same time bounds: ¤ Player Optimum: Expected reward to a chosen player.
¤
Social Optimum: Total expected reward, summed over all players.
Welfare Optimum: Expected reward to the player whose expected reward is smallest.
Equilibria with any of these properties are known to be NPhard to find in the exact case, even in games with just two players (Gilboa and Zemel 1989) .
